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Introduction
Maintaining a motivated group of individuals that are willing 
to donate blood is a key aspect of any blood donation service. 
Since blood donations are based in large parts on voluntary 
donations, the question arises what motivates those individu-
als that are willing to donate blood and how their motivation 
can best be managed and enhanced. In particular, blood dona-
tion services are often confronted with temporary fluctuations 
in demand for whole blood donations. How can blood dona-
tion services cope with such fluctuations in demand? 
One possibility is to try and extract more donations from a 
given pool of donors. Economic theories of behavior suggest 
that one way to achieve this is to provide donors with an in-
centive to donate. However, this proposition is fiercely dis-
puted in other areas of social science. As we explain in more 
detail, evidence suggests that, under certain conditions, incen-
tives can interfere with the innate motivation to behave 
prosocially. This effect can be so strong that incentives may 
actually reduce the prosocial activity. Whether such an effect 
occurs, however, is an empirical question. The aim of this 
paper is to organize this discussion around the three dominant 
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Summary
Recent shortages in the supply of blood donations have 
renewed the interest in how blood donations can be in-
creased temporarily. We survey the evidence on the role 
of financial and other incentives in eliciting blood dona-
tions among donors who are normally willing to donate 
pro bono. We present the predictions from different em-
pirical/psychological-based theories, with some predict-
ing that incentives are effective while others predict that 
incentives may undermine prosocial motivation. The evi-
dence suggests that incentives work relatively well in 
settings in which donors are relatively anonymous, but 
evidence indicates also that when image concerns be-
come important, incentives may be counterproductive as 
donors do not want to be seen as greedy.
Schlüsselwörter
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Anreize 
Zusammenfassung
Versorgungsknappheiten mit Bluttransfusionen haben 
ein neues Interesse an der Frage geweckt, wie kurzfristig 
mehr Blutspenden hervorgerufen werden können. In die-
ser Arbeit geben wir einen Überblick über die Evidenz 
zur Rolle von finanziellen und anderen Belohnungen. Wir 
diskutieren die verschiedenen theoretischen Ansätze. 
Einige Theorien legen positive Effekte von Belohnungen 
auf Blutspenden nahe, während andere einen negativen 
Effekt auf die Spendermotivation vorhersagen. Die Evi-
denz deutet auf positive Effekte hin, insbesondere wenn 
Blutspenden relativ anonym stattfinden. Die Evidenz 
deutet jedoch auch auf negative Effekte auf die Spender-
motivation hin, wenn es der Umwelt bekannt ist, dass 
Blutspenden belohnt werden.
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motivation: Individuals may feel ‘overjustified’ and replace 
the intrinsic motivation with the material motivation. Individ-
uals may also perceive the use of payments as controlling, and 
it may be this aspect that undermines the intrinsic motivation 
in the task. 
Importantly, the theory makes no clear prediction as to 
whether the use of incentives increases or decreases the level 
of activity when incentives are used. The prediction is that the 
intrinsic motivation is destroyed, but not that the net effect is 
necessarily negative. Testing this prediction has proven to be 
tricky. The typical experiment consists of three stages: in the 
initial stage, a subject is invited to a study and has to wait for a 
while. There is a Rubik’s cube on the table, and it is measured 
for how long the subject plays with the cube. In the second 
stage, the subject is told that she will be paid based on her 
performance in the Rubik’s cube. Finally, in the third stage, 
the subject is left alone again, and it is measured how much 
the subject plays with the cube. If the subject plays less with 
the cube in the third stage than in the first, this is taken as evi-
dence that paying the subject has reduced her intrinsic inter-
est in playing with the cube. Many studies show that activity in 
the last phase is significantly lower than in the first when in-
centives are used in between. However, critics have pointed 
out that the problem with this test is that it does not hold the 
level of activity constant. Most people perform the task sig-
nificantly more intensely when they are paid than the control 
group. The number of studies has grown so large that we 
 directly refer readers to meta-analyses (see [5] for the most 
recent survey of the results). There is a fair amount of discord 
between different teams of researchers [6]. Thus, the lower 
activity may just reflect temporarily being fed up with the 
task. More convincingly, other studies have separated phases 
2 and 3 of the experiment by a longer time distance. In sup-
port of the view that intrinsic motivation is being crowded 
out, interest in the task is even lower several weeks after in-
centive have been used (see table 7 in [5]). Furthermore, one 
could argue that it was the receipt of a reward, and not the 
contingency of the reward on the activity, that changed the 
motivation. However, experiments in which participants are 
not told that they may receive a reward, but then receive one 
at the end of phase 2 anyway, do not display a decrease in the 
activity in phase 3, showing that it is not the payment of 
money, but the contingency on the reward that undermines 
the motivation (see table 5 in [5]). Thus, overall, there is clear 
evidence that monetary rewards can undermine the intrinsic 
motivation individuals have placed in a task. 
Evidence on Blood Donations
The evidence from psychology has lead researchers to specu-
late that a similar mechanism may be present if one paid indi-
viduals to donate blood, and even if the payment was just 
temporary. Titmuss’ famous book alludes to this possibility 
[7], even though no randomized study had been conducted at 
that time. The first study was conducted by Upton [8]. He 
theoretical frameworks, to discuss the evidence for the under-
lying assumptions, and to assess the evidence directly relevant 
for blood donations. 
Do Incentives Crowd Out Intrinsic Motivation?
Different disciplines in the social sciences have sharply differ-
ent views of the role of price incentives in motivating pro-
social behaviors. The aim of this section is to present the dif-
ferent theories of how incentives affect prosocial activities 
and motivation. For each section, we provide a discussion 
of the evidence pertaining to the psychological mechanisms 
and then describe the evidence directly related to blood 
donations. 
The Economic View of Incentives
Economists stress that incentives can help increase blood 
 donations much like incentives can facilitate other activities. 
Individuals may care about prosocial activities for their own 
sake, such as donating to a charitable cause or donating blood, 
but the economic model emphasizes that costs and benefits 
also matter: the model assumes that, besides other goals, indi-
viduals also care about their material wellbeing. Thus, any ac-
tivity that is rewarded more highly, will be followed more 
likely. While incentives alone certainly do not motivate blood 
donations, they may help to tip the balance to donate blood 
by somewhat lowering its costs.
The view that incentives can sometimes increase prosocial 
activities is not without empirical merit, in particular when it 
comes to charitable donations. For example, a recent study [1] 
examine the impact of matching on charitable donations. 
Matching refers to the promise to match every dollar the indi-
vidual donates by a factor of x. Thus, the effective price of a 
donation becomes cheaper for the individual, and conse-
quently he/she should donate more. Evidence shows indeed a 
positive impact of matching on the likelihood to donate 
money. Another study [2] examines the impact of chance to 
win a prize on donations. In a randomized field experiment, 
some households were offered the chance to win a monetary 
prize if they donated money while others served as a control 
group and were not offered any money. Again, offering the 
prize raised charitable contributions. 
Crowding Out of Intrinsic Motivation
Since the early 1970s, the general view that incentives elicit a 
higher level of activity has been scrutinized. In particular, psy-
chologists have examined tasks for which individuals in most 
cases display a motivation to perform them even when they 
are not paid, mostly because they are interesting by them-
selves. The basic argument is that paying individuals for such 
tasks undermines or even destroys their intrinsic motivation 
in the task [3, 4]. Various psychological mechanisms have 
been suggested that may lead to the undermining of intrinsic 
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increased their propensity to donate in response to the lottery 
ticket if they had wanted to, like the group of generally less 
motivated donors. Thus, they find sizeable reactions to the 
lottery ticket, in particular in the subgroup of donors that nor-
mally do not donate blood very often. However, so far, the 
key prediction of the crowding-out hypothesis has not been 
tested. If donors are invited again and the incentives are no 
longer used, does this reduce the propensity to donate blood? 
Our subjects were subsequently invited according to the nor-
mal procedures, which allowed us to examine this point [11]. 
We followed the donors up to 18 months after the termination 
of the experiment, but find no effect on subsequent donations. 
If anything, individuals who had previously received a lottery 
ticket are slightly more likely to donate blood in the 18 
months subsequent to the study, but the effect is not signifi-
cant. Furthermore, no interaction with donor type is observed 
in the 18 months after the experiment. Thus, to this date, 
there is no evidence of crowding out of motivation for blood 
donations when incentives are used.
These generally positive results of incentives on blood do-
nations are also surprising given the results from surveys 
among blood donors. Glynn et al. [12] asked donors in a sur-
vey how different types of gifts and incentives would impact 
their motivation to donate. The response was mixed: some say 
they would donate more while others say they would donate 
less. They also asked them about the type of incentives to be 
used. The emerging pattern was that the more the incentive 
used resembles money, the less it was accepted. Similar results 
were obtained for Europe by Lacetera and Macis [13]. The 
category that was most accepted [12] were incentives that 
were somehow related to health. Goette et al. [14] reported 
the results from another treatment of the Zurich experiment: 
in this treatment, individuals had been offered a free choles-
terol test if they show up to donate blood. The offer of the test 
had no effect on donations. The authors also searched in vari-
ous subgroups, cutting the sample by age, motivation and gen-
der, but they fail to detect any reaction. Thus, in contrast to 
the survey evidence, offering a reward such as a health test 
appeared to be ineffective, while in the same sample, the lot-
tery ticket increased donations. We find it difficult to explain 
why survey results and evidence from randomized trials point 
in so different directions. In contrast to surveys, experiments 
have the advantage of measuring actual preferences, rather 
than stated preferences as in surveys. The discrepancy in re-
sults makes it clear that caution has to be applied to interpret-
ing results from surveys. 
To summarize, the results reviewed in this section showed 
no negative effects of incentives on blood donations when the 
studies were properly randomized. It is important, however, 
to keep in mind the scope of these studies. An important con-
cern is that financial incentives may attract donors with worse 
risk factors [7]. Keeping in mind that all studies so far have 
only examined short-run interventions, there is so far no evi-
dence that incentives attract donors with worse health charac-
called individuals and asked them to sign up for a blood dona-
tion. The treatment group was promised compensation if they 
donated blood while the control group was not. The depend-
ent variable of the study was to then measure whether a donor 
follows through on his pledge and donates blood. Upton [8] 
found that of the individuals who had donated blood before – 
presumably a measure of higher motivation to donate blood 
– those who were promised compensation were less likely to 
follow through and show up for donate, while he observed the 
opposite pattern for individuals who never donated before. 
But, while suggestive of crowding-out of motivation, a failure 
to properly randomize makes it difficult to interpret this re-
sult. Upton [8] already announced the compensation when he 
recruited individuals to sign up, thus potentially changing the 
composition of donors in the treatment and the control group. 
Any differences in behavior between the two groups can thus 
not be interpreted as the causal effect of incentives on behav-
ior. An experiment that would have avoided this problem 
would have recruited all donors without the promise of com-
pensation. One could then randomly select half of the partici-
pants, call them again, and tell them that, if they follow 
through on their pledge, they would receive a reward. This 
way, the assignment of the reward occurs after the pledge has 
been made and can longer affect the pledge.
However, more recently, evidence has been accumulating 
on the effects of incentives on blood donations. Most studies 
used a design in which the use of incentives was explicitly ran-
domized. The foremost interest of the studies was to examine 
whether incentives would lead to more blood donations. Fer-
rari et al. [9] had offered coupons that could be redeemed for 
merchandise and found that it strongly increased the propen-
sity to donate blood in their sample of college students. Re-
searchers have used a variety of incentives. Another study 
[10] used T-shirts as incentives in a randomized study. How-
ever, they found no significant impact on the propensity to 
donate blood. We [11] conducted an experiment with blood 
donors of the Red Cross blood donation service in the canton 
of Zurich. During a 3-month period, some of the blood do-
nors had been offered a lottery ticket (which would cost about 
USD 5.– in stores) if they donate blood in one of the Red 
Cross donation centers, while others had been invited as usual 
– without a reward. We found a 5% increase in the proportion 
of donations if individuals were promised a lottery ticket. We 
also found a strong interaction of the treatment with the indi-
vidual’s inherent propensity to donate. The entire effect of 
the lottery ticket came from donors who have a baseline rate 
of about 30% to donate blood: The lottery ticket increased 
their donations by almost 9%, a large and significant increase. 
By contrast, individuals with a higher baseline probability to 
donate (approximately 75%) showed absolutely no reaction 
to the lottery ticket. It should be noticed that this cannot be 
explained by a mechanical ceiling effect. All donors who were 
invited were prescreened to donate blood, and the baseline 
donation rates were low enough so that this group could have 
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condition clearly clicked more than subjects in the private 
condition [see also 18]. Thus, the prospect that others will 
found out how much effort they put into charitable donations 
(the number of clicks) motivated subjects to generate more 
donations. The results also showed that image concerns affect 
the effectiveness of incentives: while in the private condition, 
incentives clearly raised the effort of the subjects, this was not 
the case in the public condition. If anything, incentives low-
ered the effort put into generating donations, in line with the 
predictions from the model [16]. That incentives undermine 
prosocial motivations in public settings is also consistent with 
the results from several studies [19]. All the available evi-
dence suggests that small financial rewards undermine proso-
cial motivations only in a situation in which effort choices and 
the fact that effort was or was not rewarded were public. 
Evidence on Blood Donations
A clever study aimed at testing the relevance of this mecha-
nism directly in the context of blood donations [20]. The au-
thors conducted an experiment with three conditions. In the 
baseline conditions, participants were asked whether or not 
they want to donate blood. There was a bus waiting for them, 
taking them directly to the nearest donation center. There-
fore, in this treatment, as in the others, the decision to donate 
blood was public, as it was very clear who gets into the bus 
and who does not. In the first treatment, subjects were offered 
money if they donate blood. In the second treatment, subjects 
were offered the possibility to donate the money to a charita-
ble organization. The difference between the first and the 
 second treatment was that the second treatment offered an 
opportunity to signal that one was not doing it for the money, 
by giving the money away. Therefore, the prediction was that 
incentives should be more effective in the second treatment 
than in the first. The results were somewhat muddled, but 
generally supportive of this mechanism: overall, there were no 
significant differences across the three conditions. However, 
the authors found a strong interaction with gender. While the 
propensity to donate of men was unaffected by any of the 
treatments, women did react strongly to the treatments: dona-
tion rates were markedly lower when females were offered 
incentives. However, the effect can be avoided when they 
were given the possibility to donate the money. The fact that 
the effect only showed up in a subsample was somewhat prob-
lematic. Other studies testing for image motivation [17] did 
not find a similar interaction with gender, though survey evi-
dence was consistent with it [21]. It implies that women are 
more sensitive to image rewards, which could be tested in 
other settings. 
One study [21] examined correlational evidence from a 
large number of local blood drives in the USA. Some of these 
blood drives offer incentives such as T-shirts, or gift cards for 
local stores. The evidence reveals that drives that offer gifts 
attract more donors. However, one has to be very careful in 
interpreting these results: the incentives to donors are not 
teristics among a pool of previous donors [11]. However, no 
randomized evaluation exists to examine the long-run effects. 
Most of the studies were conducted with prescreened blood 
donors, and donations took place in the relative privacy of 
 donation centers. They are consistent with the results from 
field experiments examining the effect of incentives on chari-
table donations, where positive incentive effects are found as 
well. Overall, the results provide no support for the predic-
tions from theories of motivational crowding [15]. They pro-
vide moderate support for the view that incentives help to 
tip the balance in favor of more blood donations. However, 
 several studies also found no effects, and this type of hetero-
geneity remains to be explained. 
Incentives and Image Concerns in Blood Donations
Thus, while the evidence from the previous section comes 
from studies in which donors donated blood in the relative 
privacy of donation centers, this is often not the case. An im-
portant fraction of blood donations is collected in blood 
drives, which often have a strong social component to them. 
Participation is far from anonymous as, depending on the set-
ting, one’s co-workers, neighbors or friends may know 
whether or not one donated blood. Recent research in eco-
nomics has identified such situations as an additional con-
straint on the effectiveness of incentives. 
Image Concerns and Prosocial Motivations
Recent theoretical models [16] argue that individuals also 
care about what others think of them. In particular, individu-
als want to be seen as prosocial and do not want to be seen as 
driven by monetary concerns. Under these circumstances, in-
centives may reduce prosocial activities because they make 
individuals look greedy. Consider a situation in which blood 
donations are not rewarded. Those individuals who care 
enough about blood donations will be willing donate anyway. 
Because they donate blood, they are also recognized as such 
and enjoy image rewards. However, consider what happens 
when incentives are introduced. Incentives make it attractive 
for less motivated individuals to donate blood as well. Worse 
yet, they may attract individuals that simply do it for the 
money, thus further lowering the image rewards from donat-
ing blood. Thus, incentives may deter individuals who previ-
ously had donated blood. In a clever experiment, Ariely et al. 
[17] tested this mechanism. Subjects had the opportunity to 
generate donations for charitable causes by performing pairs 
of clicks on the keyboard of their computer. There were two 
treatment variables: financial incentives and whether or not 
the donation was public. In the public condition, subjects had 
to stand up one by one at the end of the experiment and an-
nounce how often they clicked and whether they were paid. 
The results first showed that image concerns were an impor-
tant determinant of charitable giving: subjects in the public 
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concerns by individuals to look greedy or cheap if they donate 
when incentives are used are heightened, and theory predicts 
potentially negative effects of incentives [16]. The mechanisms 
have been shown to be in place for other forms of prosocial 
behavior when the activity is publicly observed [17–19]. Evi-
dence also provides some evidence that this is  relevant for 
blood donations [20], though the results are still  inconclusive 
and contradictory [21]. More studies are needed to address 
this issue, and caution should be applied in using incentives 
in more public settings until the results become clearer. 
While the focus of this paper was to examine the potential 
role of incentives in overcoming temporary shortages, one can 
also ask whether this may be a smart strategy in the long-run. 
In this case, the concerns are heightened by the potential that 
paying for blood donations may attract donors with worse 
health risk factors. But while anecdotes about the long-run 
 effects abound [22, 23], we are not aware of any credibly rand-
omized study to address this question. In fact, little is known 
about the long-run effects on using incentives also in other 
 domains of prosocial behavior. However, efforts may be mis-
placed to explore the effectiveness of incentives in this case. 
For other dimensions of prosocial behavior, other mechanisms 
have been shown to be effective, making them a more natural 
candidate to examine their role in blood donations. For exam-
ple, consistent with the results that individuals care about their 
image, results also show that individuals adjust their prosocial 
behavior in response to what others do: if others contribute 
more, so do they [24, 25]. Such mechanisms have also proved 
powerful in different areas such as effort put into work [26] or 
schooling choices for children [27]. Several possible policies 
could take advantage of this mechanism in increasing blood 
donations in the long run. After considerable effort has been 
put into examining incentives, it may be time to turn attention 
to exploring the role of other motivations in blood donations. 
Such a venture poses new challenges to a randomized evalua-
tion, but many techniques to estimate the effects of others’ 
 behavior on one’s own have been developed. 
Disclosure
The authors declared no conflict of interest.
randomized across drives, but allocated by district managers 
to particular drives. Furthermore, the data do not allow the 
identification of the number of donors that were invited to a 
drive. Thus, if drives with a larger potential donor base are 
more likely to use incentives, this would bias the estimation 
results towards finding a positive correlation between incen-
tives and donations. 
To summarize, the evidence with regard to the importance 
of image concerns in blood donations is mixed. While experi-
ments show that image concerns are important in other do-
mains of prosocial behavior, clean evidence on blood dona-
tions is still lacking. Studies that examine this issue either show 
ambiguous results [20] or are not properly randomized [21]. 
Concluding Remarks
This paper reviews empirical studies that examine the effec-
tiveness of incentives to (temporarily) increase blood dona-
tions. The evidence shows that when the donations are made 
in the relative anonymity of donation centers, incentives are 
effective in generating more donations [9, 11, 14]. Further-
more, the evidence also suggests that a very simple form of 
incentives – lottery tickets or gift vouchers – have a significant 
impact, in particular on donors who in general have a lower 
propensity to donate. The evidence we review also suggests 
that other incentives such as offering a cholesterol test [14] or 
T-shirts [10] do not lead to an increase in donations. This evi-
dence is in line with evidence from other forms of prosocial 
behaviors, such as charitable donations [1, 2]. The evidence 
reviewed here lends no support to the conjecture that the 
crowding effects of incentives found in intrinsically interesting 
tasks [5] carry over to prosocial activities. Psychological theo-
ries of intrinsic motivation raise the possibility that individu-
als’ motivation will be permanently undermined by the use of 
incentives, but the one study that can track blood donors over 
18 months after incentives have been used showed no such 
 effect [11]. 
Thus, while the evidence points to largely positive (or zero) 
effects of incentives when donations take place in relatively 
anonymous donation centers, much less is known about the 
 effect of incentives in more public blood drives. In such drives, 
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